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(2) But Pleasure and Pain are not only subjective, they are also
said to be passive states : in this they differ from Attention, which
is active. That Excitement is intimately connected—both
causally and consequentially—with attention, there can be no
doubt. But the same may be said of Pleasure and Pain. If
pleasure is the accompaniment (effect) of the " effective exercise
of attention" (see Dr. Ward's article in Encyc. Brit., xx. 71) and
pain of the "ineffective exercise of attention," excitement of a high
degree seems often to be the accompaniment (cause or effect) of a-
rapid alternation of attention, which is such as not to produce
either much pain or much pleasure. In as far as such states of
excitement are dependent on a phase of attention—but surely
distinguishable from attention—they seem to be purely passive
phases on a level with pleasure and pain. But in as far as states of
excitement seem to determine changes of attention, they still fulfil
one of the functions of pleasure and pain.
(3) This leads us to the relation of Peeling to action. Pleasure
and Pain are regarded by a school of psychologists as the sole
determinants of all that may be called psychical action. But-
Excitement may also determine many actions which would
not usually be regarded as irrational, though verging more
or less on the irrational. Such excitement is often colour-
less as regards pleasure and pain, while, again, the action
is pursued independently of pleasures or pains to be gained
or averted. Hence, still maintaining that psychical action is.
always determined by Feeling, we ought under variations of
Feeling to include differences in degree of Excitement as well as of
Pleasure and Pain.
Whether, then, we consider the subjectivity of Feeling, or its-
dependence on presentation and on attention, or its influence on
action, we are led to the conclusion that Feeling is a constituent
of consciousness varying not only in the positive and negative
direction, viz., as more or less Pleasure or Pain, but also in a
direction, not wholly independent of the other, viz., as more or less
of Excitement.
MILL'S NATURAL KINDS.
By F. and C. L. FBANKLIN, Baltimore, U.S.A.
The doctrine of Kinds, as laid down by Mill, does not seem to
be tenable ; but although there be no such radical and ineffaceable
distinction in favour of certain classes as is conveyed by the word
Kind, and by Mill's explanation of it, yet there is, we think, a real
difference between such classes and mere arbitrary classes ; and
the nature of that difference may be stated very nearly as Mill
stated it. In point of fact there are, for all purposes of practice,
classes which possess that salient peculiarity upon which Mill
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lays chief stress in characterising Natural Kinds, viz., that the
possession of a few qualities ensures the possession of others
which do not follow logically, nor, as far as we know, physically,
from the first. I t is not merely that in regard to a horse, or a
bit of sulphur, "many general assertions are possible," as Mr.
Towry (see MIND NO. 47, pp. 434 ff.) says; but that a few asser-
tions are sufficient to mark off the class of which these many
assertions are true; while in regard to classes defined by an
arbitrary choice of qualities, no general assertions are possible
except those which follow from the definition. Yet, says Mr.
Towry, " the one class is no whit less a merely intellectual creation
than the other ". That it is an intellectual creation, and not a
group absolutely insulated in nature by impassable chasms, we
admit; but that it is a merely intellectual creation, in the sense
in which an arbitrary class is such, seems impossible.
The true view of the case seems to us to flow from the general
doctrine of Causation. When one event invariably accompanies
another event, we consider them to be connected through causa-
tion ; i.e., either as cause and effect or as effects of a common
cause. In like manner, if all objects which possess the attributes
a and b are found in nature to possess a number of other attributes
in common, we cannot believe that this is a mere coincidence;
we are forced to conclude either that the given attributes are
accompanied by the others in virtue of a general law of causation,
or that the objects have a certain community of origin.
Thus it seems to us that the fault in Mill's discussion was not
that he made a distinction where none exists, but that he regarded
the distinction as an ultimate fact, instead of a thing to be
explained. The very terms, however, in which he drew the
distinction point to the mode in which it may be explained;
though, on the other hand, it must be admitted that the explana-
tion, while it explains the chief distinction, explains away much
that Mill laid down concerning it. When a certain set of qualities
entails the presence of others, and the supposition cannot be
entertained that there is a causal connexion of a general nature
between them, the conclusion is inevitable, as we have said,
that there is a certain community of origin among the objects
possessing that set of qualities. The phrase in italics is
designedly vague; for we never refer things to an absolute
origin. Accordingly, the classes which are in some sense entitled
to the name of Kinds, inasmuch as the objects composing them
are really connected in nature by so genuine a bond as that of
community of origin, are nevertheless loosely defined, and may
narrow or widen, or be lost entirely, according to the direction
and extent of the lines along which their origin may be imagined
to be traced. While, however, this does away with the mysterious
and impassable chasm between Natural Kinds, it does not
seriously impair that other character—perhaps too strongly
insisted upon by Mill—of the indefiniteness of the number of
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common attributes; for, if we regard the invariable concomitance
of certain qualities with certain other marks as proof of a common
origin in the objects possessing those marks, there is no reason
for setting any limit to the number of ways in which that com-
mon origin will be betrayed.
It is not meant to be implied in the foregoing, that in the case
of all " Natural Kinds" community of origin has been the actual
ground of classification, or even a subsequently found character.
To take what seems, in some respects, the simplest possible
instance, the chemical elements, there is not, within the present
writers' knowledge, any external evidence that all the sodium, for
example, in the universe was derived from a common stock ; but
it seems highly probable that either this is the case or else that
all the properties of sodium are deducible by general laws from a
few of them. In other words, the fact that all portions of matter
which possess a few of the properties of sodium do actually
possess all the other properties of sodium forces upon us the con-
viction that either the qualities or the objects have a real con-
nexion with each other. If the former is the case, the properties of
sodium are deductions from its molecular constitution; if the
latter, then sodium is in a very valid sense a Natural Kind—some-
thing very different from an arbitrary and " merely intellectual"
class : and this, whether one agrees or does not agree with the
present writers in regarding the connexion between the objects
to reside in a certain community of origin. In the case of the
animals forming a species, it would be preposterous to suppose
that all the common qualities might be explained deductively
from a few of them. These, then, form a Natural Kind, in the sense
in which we have used the term ; and, in this case, community of
origin has been sufficiently shown to be the true ground of the
classification. It is a matter of course that such classes are not
more but less rigidly marked off than arbitrary classes. The
quality of " naturalness " is attributed to them, not in virtue of
their boundaries being clearly marked out by nature, but because,
however indistinct the actual boundary may turn out to be, the
principle on which it is drawn points to a natural and not a
merely intellectual connexion among the objects it includes.
THE AIM OF INDUCTIVE EEASONING.
By JOSEPH SOLOMON.
Inductive Logic seems to me to be in a state of some confusion
at the present time. There is not perhaps much to be added in
the way of statement or elucidation to the general description of
the processes by which natural truths, other than mere facts of
observation, are attained to ; but there seems still to be much
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